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As markets become globalized, food safety policy and international trade policy 
are increasingly intertwined. Globalization also means that food safety incidents 
are widely reported internationally. One result is that food safety incidents can 
negatively impact products where no food safety issue exists as consumers lose 
trust in both foreign and domestic food safety institutions. While the policy 
framework for dealing with directly effected imported foods is well understood, 
how to deal with the market failure associated with indirectly affected products 
within the existing trade policy rules has not been explored. Using the example of 
China’s 2007 problems with a spate of products safety incidents, a theoretical 
framework is developed and the response of both the Chinese and Canadian 
governments analyzed. A cooperative approach to the issues appears to have a 
number of advantages and does not contravene trade policy commitments. 
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1.0 Introduction 
In 2007, a series of product safety incidents involving food, toys and other 
products exported from China garnered considerable international attention and 
have led to rising levels of concern among consumers in importing countries. Early 
in the year there were reports of dozens of deaths in Panama after people 
consumed cold medicines containing diethylene glycol, improperly labelled as 
glycerine, from China. Then, in the following weeks a number of incidents followed 
in quick succession: that pet food from China laced with melamine, a coal 
derivative, had poisoned and even led to the death of pets across North America; 
that toy trains manufactured in China painted with lead-based paints had been 
discovered; that lethal antibiotics from China were being sold and; that 
substandard Chinese tires prone to bursting were widely available. A number of 
product recalls in North America, Europe and South Africa followed in response to 
reports of stepped-up monitoring. The incidents received extensive attention from 
the media leading to further western media investigations examining safety issues 
in the Chinese domestic market and considerable editorializing which suggested a 
range of policy responses from increased border inspections to outright import 
bans on products from China. Consumer trust for products in a number of 
important export markets for China was clearly declining. 
The  Made-in-China label was seriously tarnished due to this series of 
product safety scandals. In the face of the rising storm of complaints from around 
the world, and anxious to defend the international reputation of China as a global 
supplier, the Chinese government treated the problem seriously and attempted to 
put in place effective measures to ensure the safety of food and the general 
reliability of Chinese products. 
In Canada, a series of recalls of imported Chinese products took place and 
product safety investigations were initiated for range of other products, including 
pet food, toothpaste and children’s toys. In June, 2007, Health Canada warned 
consumers against using certain brands of toothpaste imported from China that 4 
 
were found to contain diethylene glycol, a chemical used in antifreeze. More than 
18 million toys manufactured in China, marketed under the Mattel brand, were 
pulled from retail shelves for high lead levels and magnet safety problems. Other 
recalls over the summer of 2007 involved Thomas the Train products, and 
children’s jewellery and art sets (CBC, 2007a). Subsequently, imports of food 
products from China have also received considerable media attention in Canada. 
As in other import markets, consumers’ trust of Chinese made products has 
declined and the Canadian government has been buffeted with demands that it do 
more to ensure the safety of Canadian consumers. Canada is an important trade 
partners for China. In 2006, Canada imported roughly 368 million kilograms of 
food from China (CTC, 2007). 
Given the growing importance of the Canadian market for Chinese food 
exports and the decline of trust among Canadian consumers; What should be the 
appropriate response of the Chinese and Canadian governments? This paper 
examines the welfare effects of various policy options and then examines the 
evolution of both the Chinese and Canadian governments’ response in the wake 
of the spate of product safety incidents in 2007. 
2.0 Modelling Collateral Damage and Trade Policy Responses 
  This paper does not deal with trade policy responses in the case of 
imported products where a food safety incident has occurred. The correct trade 
policy response for both governments is clear in such cases. The importing 
country should remove the “unsafe” product from its domestic market and all 
imports of that product should be embargoed until the government in the exporting 
country makes the changes necessary to satisfy the importing government that 
future shipments meet or exceed an acceptable threshold of product safety. 
According to the provisions of the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS) of the World Trade Organization, importing regulations should be 
“science based” and incorporate a risk assessment (Kerr, 2003). Each country is 
allowed to specify its own acceptable level of risk but that level of risk cannot 5 
 
discriminate among trading partners and should be consistent across products – 
i.e. the acceptable level of risk for beef should be the same as for pork (Kerr and 
Hobbs, 2005). The degree of vigilance in inspecting imports and monitoring the 
activities of foreign supply chain participants is a subject for bilateral discussions 
between the importing and exporting government although in the long run these 
activities are governed by the WTO principle of non-discrimination. 
  This paper deals with cases of collateral damage. Collateral damage is 
suffered by imported products when no food safety incidents have occurred. 
Collateral damage arises as a result of a product safety incident or a series of 
product safety incidents that occur in other products from a particular country but 
where consumers experience a general loss of trust in products sourced from that 
country. In other words, the exporting country’s label is damaged or the equity of 
the national brand is diminished (Innes et al., 2007). This collateral damage is a 
market failure and reduces economic welfare in both countries. The question 
arises as to what the appropriate policy response of both governments should be 
to correct the market failure. It is important to emphasise that these are imported 
products where no food safety problem has been identified and that the importing 
government has confidence in both the foreign government’s food safety regime 
and in its own mechanisms to ensure the safety of food. No food safety system 
can ensure zero risk and the marginal costs of additional efforts to ensure the 
safety of food needs to be considered in the context of the additional benefits 
provided by those efforts (Hobbs and Kerr, 1999). The effect of collateral damage 
on food imports from China is modeled in Figure 1. 6 
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2.1 Collateral  damage 
The interaction between China as an exporter and Canada as an importer 
for an individual agri-food product is depicted in Figure 1. There is no domestic 
Canadian production of this product. Hence, the supply curves depicted in the 
Canadian market are Chinese export supply curves (i.e. SCdn0 is the horizontal 
difference between non-Canadian demand for the Chinese product, DCnaD+F
1 and 
Chinese supply, SCna0 at any price). 
In the absence of consumer concerns pertaining to the safety of imported 
Chinese products the demand curve in Canada is DCdn0 and the Canadian market 
is in equilibrium at P0 and QCdn1. The welfare of Canadians is area a + b + c + d + 
e + f (remembering that there is no domestic Canadian supply so the producer 
surplus – area g + h + i + j + k + l + m accrues to Chinese producers
2. 
In the Chinese market, DCnaD is domestic demand for the agri-food product. 
China may also export the product to countries other than Canada. As we are 
interested in the interaction between the Chinese and Canadian market this 
additional export demand is added to the domestic Chinese demand yielding 
DCnaD+F. Thus, China exports to Canada equal QCna1-QCna2 in the absence of any 
concerns in Canada regarding the safety of food imported from China.
3 
Suppose there is a well-publicized food safety incident (or incidents) 
pertaining to imported food products from China in Canada. It is important to 
emphasise that there is no food safety incident pertaining to the product depicted 
in Figure 1. Some consumers in Canada, however, generally loose trust in the 
safety of food imports from China. As a result, demand declines for all food 
imports from China in Canada including the product depicted in Figure 1. The 
decline in trust results in a shift in the Canadian demand for the product to DCdn1. 
This shift in demand is the collateral damage suffered by this product as a result of 
                                                        
1  DCnaD+F is the sum of Chinese domestic demand and the import demand of countries other than 
Canada.  
2 The producers’ surplus in the Canadian market is equal to areas v + t + k + l +S in the Chinese 
market. 
3  QCna1-QCna2 is exactly equal to 0-QCdn1. 8 
 
the food safety incident(s) in market(s) for other Chinese products. This is a 
market failure because there is no food safety problem associated with this 
product. The producers of unsafe Chinese products take no account of the 
externality they impose on other products as a result of the general decline in 
trust. 
As a result of the collateral damage the Canadian market clears at P1 and 
QCdn2. The welfare of Canadians declines from a + b + c + d + e + f to b + d + g + 
k.
4 Chinese producers surplus unambiguously declines by g + h + i + j + k to l + 
m.
5  Trade between China and Canada declines from QCdn1 to QCdn2. The negative 
externality associated with the collateral damage reduces the total welfare arising 
in the Canadian market to b + d + g + k + l + m – a decline of a + c + e + f + h + i + 
j. Given the market failure, governments may wish to intervene to remove the 
externality and increase welfare. Governments in importing countries may also 
face pressure to take other actions to protect their consumers. 
2.2 An import embargo 
In the wake of the incidents pertaining to the safety of Chinese products in 
2007, some consumer advocates and media commentators suggested that 
imports of Chinese products should be banned.
6 A ban would lead to a further 
decline in the welfare of Canadians equal to b + d + g + k. The Chinese market 
would clear where DCnaD+F equals SCna0 and global welfare excluding Canada 
would decline by K + L. The embargo would mean that the Chinese government 
would have no direct incentive to engage in activities that would rebuild the trust of 
Canadians – i.e. to remove the market failure
7. In the absence of any evidence of 
                                                        
4 Assuming  that  a + c + e + f > g + k. 
5  In China producer surplus declines by area Z + Y + X + W + V + T + S although there is a gain in 
Chinese consumer surplus of Z. Consumers of imports other than Canadians also gain by Y + X + W. 
The net loss is V + T. 
6  Producers of close substitutes for the banned Chinese products would also benefit. We ignore 
any positive government response to traditional protectionist pressures. 
7 Remembering that there is no food safety problem for this Chinese product. Strategically, the 
Chinese government may wish to engage in activities that improve their general food safety 
system in the hope that it will persuade the Canadian government to lift the ban.  9 
 
a problem with the particular product, China would have the right to bring a trade 
action forward to the WTO for “nullification of expected benefits” if the embargo 
was imposed without a reason being given or for lack of a scientific justification or 
a risk assessment if the ban was imposed under the SPS Agreement (Kerr, 2006). 
China might also wish to informally retaliate by imposing non-tariff barriers on 
imports of unrelated goods from Canada. Further, the imposition of an import 
embargo would be a tacit admission that the Canadian food safety regime for 
imported products is not effective, which could lead to a further broad decline in 
trust of imported products and, hence, a further decline in the welfare of Canadian 
consumers. An import embargo does not appear to be an appropriate policy 
response by the Canadian government. 
2.3 Unilateral action by the Chinese government 
  Given that the externality that led to the collateral damage arose from the 
actions of other Chinese firms or a failure in the food safety regime of the Chinese 
government (or both), the Chinese government might wish to engage in activities 
that would remove the market failure – to move the demand curve in Canada from 
DCdn1 back towards DCdn0. These unilateral activities could take the form of 
increased monitoring and testing of Chinese products prior to exporting to Canada, 
the raising of food safety standards and increased penalties for breaches of the 
food safety rules and corrupt activities in the food inspection bureaucracy. These 
activities could involve both increased compliance costs for Chinese firms and 
additional budgetary expenditures by the Chinese government. The latter would 
include additional domestic monitoring costs and costs associated with informing 
Canadian consumers of the initiatives. Additional compliance costs incurred by 
firms would shift the Chinese supply curve to the left. If the heightened food safety 
activities were only applied to products exported to Canada the additional costs to 
Chinese firms would be a maximum of Q + A + B + C + J + I + L + T + N depending on   
 10 
 
the efficacy of the measures in shifting the demand curve back toward DCdn0.
8 To 
this extra cost to the firms must be added the additional budgetary expenditures of 
the Chinese government. If the Chinese government wanted the measures to 
apply to all products whether exported to Canada, other countries or sold in the 
domestic market the total cost would expend to R + Q + A + B + C + J + I + L + T + N 
plus the additional government budgetary expenditure. 
  The benefits that accrue to China from the investment in removing the 
market failure, however, are equal to a maximum of g + h + d + c which is less 
than the total welfare loss due to the market failure (i.e. a + c + e +f + i + j). A 
rational Chinese government would only incur additional costs up to the point 
where the marginal costs imposed on the Chinese economy equals the marginal 
benefit received. Given that g + d + c < a + c + e +f + i + j the probability that the 
Chinese government will not invest to a sufficient degree to entirely remove the 
market failure increases.
9 
2.4 Unilateral action by the Canadian government 
The Canadian government could also act unilaterally to remove the market 
failure. It could increase the strictness of its import regime in an attempt to regain 
the trust of Canadian consumers in Chinese products – to shift the demand curve 
back to DCdn0. These activities could increase the costs for Chinese exporting firms 
to a maximum of l + k + i + e depending upon the efficacy of the measures in 
shifting the demand curve back to DCdn0. To the costs imposed on the Chinese 
firms would have to be added any increased Canadian government monitoring 
costs and any costs associated with informing consumers of its actions. If the 
Canadian government increased it monitoring of imports without increasing the 
                                                        
8 If the measures are fully successful in shifting the demand curve back to DCdn0 then imports 
would equal QCdn3 and be equal to Chinese exports of QCna5 to QCna6 which leads to increased 
costs of Q + A + B + C + J + I + L + T + N. If the measures fail to fully shift the demand curve, exports to 
Canada will be smaller and the additional costs commensurately less. 
9 This discussion ignores the possibility that with trust the Canadian market for the Chinese 
product could be expected to grow – the demand in Canada would expand beyond DCdn0. Thus, the 
Chinese government might well be willing to invest more to regain the trust of Canadian consumers 
but the probability that it will under-invest relative to the potential gain in total welfare is still high. 11 
 
strictness of procedures that would have to be followed by Chinese firms, then 
there would be no shift in the supply curve and the entire cost would be borne by 
the Canadian taxpayer. If no costs were imposed on Chinese firms from Canadian 
government activities to increase trust, then the maximum increase in the welfare 
of Canadians would be a + c + e + f minus g + k while if additional costs were 
imposed on Chinese firms equal to the vertical distance between SCdn1 and SCdn0, 
then the maximum gain in Canadian welfare would be a minus d + g + k. If the 
Canadian policy was not sufficient to shift the demand curve back to DCdn0 then 
the gain in Canadian welfare would be less than the maximum. 
If the Canadian government’s unilateral policy imposed additional costs on 
Chinese firms, the Chinese government could launch a trade complaint against 
the Canadian government. Remember, there is no actual problem with the safety 
of the product in question. The Chinese government may also retaliate unofficially 
by imposing non-tariff barriers on imports of unrelated Canadian products. 
It may, however, be in the Chinese government’s interest to cooperate with 
the Canadian government initiative as it may increase Chinese welfare. Again, this 
will depend on the efficacy of the Canadian initiative in shifting out the demand 
curve by restoring trust. If Canadian consumers have more trust in the Canadian 
government than the Chinese government, then it may be more efficient to allow 
the Canadian government to engage in activities to build trust – i.e. for the same 
increase in costs to Chinese firms a larger increase in Canadian demand may be 
achieved. 
Again, the unilateral policy may lead to under-investment in reducing the 
externality. For example, the maximum gain in Canadian welfare a + c + e +f 
minus g + k is less than the total gain in welfare from re-establishing trust a + c + e 
+f +j + i. Thus, as a + c + e +f minus g + k < a + c + e +f +j + i the probability that 
the Canadian government will under-invest increases. 
2.5 Cooperation between the Chinese and Canadian governments 
Given that unilateral action by neither government is likely to entirely 12 
 
remove the market failure, a cooperative solution is suggested. A cooperative 
solution has a number of advantages beyond the observation that collectively the 
two governments stand to obtain all of the welfare gains for their citizens.
10 It 
would allow the efforts of the two governments to be applied where they are most 
efficient. For example, the Canadian government may find it less costly to 
re-establish trust among Canadian consumers than the Chinese government. On 
the other hand, Chinese firms may be more willing to comply with additional 
regulations imposed by their own government than those imposed by foreigners. 
The threat of a trade action is removed because, while an importer imposing more 
stringent regulations than those that apply to other trading partners would violate 
the WTO principle of non-discrimination, there is nothing to prevent trading 
partners from voluntarily agreeing to raise standards. Further, open disputes 
between countries tend to garner media attention, which could further erode trust. 
Countries agreeing to cooperate to enhance the degree of safety, however, may 
well be seen in a positive light by consumers and ease the task of re-establishing 
trust. It is clear that if the effects of collateral damage are to be removed that both 
governments have a role. It is a market failure where unilateral action by either 
government may not yield the maximum welfare attainable from efforts to remove 
the market failure. While rebuilding trust is a complex activity and the benefits may 
not exceed the costs
11, if demand can be returned to DCdn0 cooperation between 
the two governments could provide the means to minimize the cost difference 
between SCdn1 and SCdn0, thus minimizing the final distortion and loss of welfare in 
                                                        
10  Of course, it is not an easy task to determine the correct contribution of each government. That 
will depend on the relative efficacy of each government’s ability to build trust and the elasticities of 
the supply and demand curves. 
11 Benefits will not exceed costs if Δ(a + c + h) < Δ(e +i + k + l) + Δ(budgetary cost to Chinese 
government) + Δ(budgetary cost to Canadian government). This could certainly be the case 
because there is no deterministic relationship between activities designed to reestablish trust and 
the actual garnering of trust. If the benefits do not exceed the costs then no action should be taken 
to remove the market failure. Given the absence of information regarding the efficacy of efforts to 
reestablish trust, it would not be possible to make this determination prior to the decision regarding 
the appropriate policy response. 13 
 
the market – of course keeping in mind the budgetary costs in both countries. 
Table 1 summarizes the policy alternatives. 
3.0 China-Canada Trade in Agri-food Products   
  Cooperation between China and Canada over food trade issues has a long 
history. Since the 1950s when Canada exported wheat to China in the face of cold 
war era opposition from the US and other countries, Canada has had good trade 
relations with China. After the two counties signed a trade agreement on the basis 
of most-favoured-nation treatment, prior to China’s entry into the WTO, bilateral 
economic relations and trade have expanded rapidly. A bilateral agreement on 
SPS issues was also reached prior to China’s WTO accession allowing an 
expansion in trade in agri-food products. 
  Currently, the agri-food products exported by China to Canada are mainly 
aquatic products, vegetables, edible fruits, nuts, grain and pastries. Frozen fish, 
apple juice, oranges, shrimp and mushrooms are among the most successful 
Chinese products exported to Canada. 
  From 1996 to 2006, agri-food trade enjoyed substantial growth with 
Chinese exports to Canada showing an average annual increase of 8.45 percent 
and Chinese imports from Canada increasing by 11.34 percent per year (Table 2). 
Compared to 1996, the total Chinese export and import volume in 2006 increased 
from 14,591,874 tons to 34,058,986 tons, and from 20,339,881 tons to 63,464,346 
tons respectively. Table 2 also shows that the export volume reached a peak in 
2005, at 36,164,697 tons, while import volume continued to reach new heights in 
2006 with 63,464,346 tons moved into the Chinese market. 
  China-Canada agri-food trade reflects an increasing trend. As volumes 
grow and supply chains proliferate, the potential risk of food safety incidents rises 
as well, leading to both an increased probability of direct disruptions to trade but 
also an increased risk that collateral damage to the Chinese or Canadian brand 
may arise. In 2006, there were just two recalls pertaining to the milk imported from 
China – due to allergic reactions to a protein.    In 2007, however, both the number14 
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  and the types of recalls of food products from China expanded. Melamine 
contamination in pet, livestock and shrimp feed were the source of major incidents 
(CFIA, 2007).    Given the problems experienced by some Chinese products in 2007, it 
is Chinese exports that need the most immediate attention from both governments. 
  
Table 2: Agri-food Trade between China and Canada, 1996-2006 

















1996  14,591,874.312  1,425,035.39 -2.51% 23,596,945.553 1,082,702.03  -11.03% 
1997  22,391,966.952  1,499,242.46 5.21% 20,339,880.982 996,787.63  -7.94% 
1998  21,893,025.268  1,390,202.63 -7.27% 20,682,735.850 834,561.73  -16.27% 
1999  21,940,653.819  1,361,878.84 -2.04% 21,274,340.594 823,789.77  -1.29% 
2000  29,927,251.447  1,569,370.33 15.24% 28,974,525.753 1,125,673.11  36.65% 
2001  26,455,138.118  1,608,919.84 2.52% 33,233,009.872 1,183,679.91  5.15% 
2002  35,209,721.515  1,815,543.45 12.84% 29,900,171.235 1,244,567.84  5.14% 
2003  44,404,775.400  2,131,933.04 17.43% 41,915,715.552 1,893,635.05  52.15% 
2004  28,231,211.338  2,338,795.27 9.70% 54,456,985.374 2,799,365.36  47.83% 
2005  36,164,697.340  2,759,138.05 17.97% 58,517,363.933 2,870,562.17  2.54% 
2006  34,058,986.336  3,141,695.54 34.33% 63,464,345.859 3,208,523.27  11.77% 
Source: The China Agriculture Yearbook, 1996-2006 
 
4.0 Food Safety in China 
After a long history of battling food shortages and being a net importer, China 
has been a net exporter of food since 1995 (Chen Xinwen, 2002). China’s population 
continues to increase and incomes have been rising in both urban and rural areas. 
Given an high income elasticity for food, both the volume and composition of food 
consumption has been changing. Both caloric intake and protein consumption have 
been rising. Further, with out migration from rural areas to cities, less and less 16 
 
consumption is taking place in close proximity to where food is grown. These changes 
have led to a rapid expansion of the food processing and distribution sectors. The 
decade from 1996 to 2006 has witnessed vigorous development of food processing 
and distribution. The total output value of the post-farm supply chains is among the 
fastest growing sectors in China. In Figure 2, the gross annual value of food 
processing and handling enterprises above a designated size (i.e. all state-owned 
enterprises and those non-state-owned enterprises with an annual sales in excess of 
RMB 5 million
12) have exhibited a sustained annual increases in growth with the 
average annual growth rate reaching 20 percent. 
 
Source: The Chinese Food Industry Yearbook 1996-2006 
While achieving this rate of growth represents a major accomplishment, it has 
not been achieved without putting considerable stress on the system. One area where 
the food system in China is exhibiting considerable strain is food safety. After ten years 
of rapid production-driven growth, the management of food safety at all the stages of 
production, processing, packaging, transporting, and retailing is overstretched leading 
to a considerable rise in incidents of food-borne illness, as can be seen in Table 3. 
                                                        
12  1 U.S. dollar equals to 7.7393 RMB. 
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Table 3: Food Safety Incidents and Food-borne Illness in China, 1996-2006 
Year Food  Incidents Food-borne  Deaths 
1996 878  23844 177 
1998 592  18533 114 
1999 591  17941 108 
2000 696  18262 157 
2001 624  20124 143 
2002 464  11572 68 
2003 1481  29600 262 
2004 2305  42876 255 
2005 621  18220 381 
2006 596  18063 196 
Source：Statistical Communiqué on Development of Medicine and Health in China, 1996-2006   
According to ongoing monitoring undertaken by the Chinese Centres for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CCDC) on pathogen contaminations in raw meat, 
milk products, aquatic products and vegetables in selected cities from 2000-2006, 
food-poisoning incidents caused by micro-organisms rank first among food safety 
incidents, with 39.62 percent of total incidents. Chemical poisons ranked second at 
38.56 percent (Hanjun, 2007).   
As the number of food safety incidents has risen, consumers have become 
increasingly sensitive to food-safety concerns and confidence is declining regarding 
the hygiene standards of, and level of safety provided by, food processors. A report 
concerning customer satisfaction and food safety done by the State Food and Drug 
Administration (SFDA) in thirty-one Chinese cities in 2006 revealed that 65 percent of 
Chinese consumers were worried about food safety (Xinhua, 2007). As a result, some 
segments of the Chinese government are clearly aware that there are urgent food 
safety problems that demand prompt attention. 
4.1 The slow pace of reform 
At present, legislation concerning food safety is scattered throughout dozens of 
laws, including the Product Quality Law, the Standardization Law, the Law on the 18 
 
Protection of Consumer Rights and Interests, the Law on the Quality and Safety of 
Agricultural Products, the Law on Criminal Acts, the Food Hygiene Law, the Law on 
Import and Export Commodity Inspection, the Law on Animal and Plant Entry and Exit 
Quarantine, The Frontier Health and Quarantine Law and the Law on Animal Disease 
Prevention (Xinhua, 2007a). 
  A Food Hygiene Law is in place, and centres on the legal regime pertaining to 
food hygiene. There is not, however, a specific legal regime for food safety. The first 
food safety law in the Peoples Republic of China – the Regulations on the 
Administration of Food Hygiene – was issued in 1965 by National People’s Congress 
(NPC). Given that it was promulgated prior to the era of market reforms and 
privatization, its focus was state-owned food processors and emphasized the security 
of the food supply rather than food safety. This law largely lapsed due to the collapse 
of the legal system in China during the Cultural Revolution. At the end of 1970s, to 
keep pace with the development of China’s economy, many new laws were put in 
place and regulations reworked and updated. In 1979, the Regulations on the 
Administration of Food Hygiene were drafted still based, however, on the 1965’s 
version. Three years later, in 1982, a new Food Hygiene Law replaced it. It was to be a 
trial implementation that attempted to accommodate the requirement of ongoing 
economic reforms. A revised Food Hygiene Law was put in place in 1995. It consisted 
of 57 articles that cover general principles and standards pertaining to food hygiene, 
food additives, packaging of, and containers to be used for, food products, and the 
supervisory system for food hygiene. It also laid out the penalties for breaches of the 
Food Hygiene Law.   
  The 1995 Food Hygiene Law has a number of flaws and weaknesses. First, the 
scope of food, as defined, did not include the agricultural products in the production 
stages of planting, breeding and pre-processing storage and, further, did not 
encompass food additives, animal feeds and feed additives. Hence, the law does not 
take a from-farm-to-fork or land-to-table approach, which leads to difficulties with the 
regulation of pesticides residues, antibiotic overuse and product contamination.  19 
 
Second, the regulations lack a system of legal liability. As a result, the penalty for a 
food enterprise proprietor breaching the law is light and, as a result, is an insufficient 
deterrent. For example, if a food producer is found to have failed to meet the 
requirements specified in the regulations for hygienic processing, they will be given a 
disciplinary warning and may also be fined not more than RMB 5000; if they 
subsequently refuse to correct their improper practices or are found to have other 
serious lapses, their hygiene license will be revoked. The punishment of conduct 
violating the rules of food hygiene should be the most elementary requirements of a 
food safety regime. While the penalty is limited to a maximum fine of RMB 5000, there 
is also scope for regulatory agencies to impose lower fines or to not penalize violations 
at all. Third, the 1995 Food Hygiene Law did not establish a system to deal with major 
food safety incidents, such as the outbreak of bird flu in China in the spring of 2004. 
Although the government quickly enacted a series of orders upon the onset of bird flu, 
the law remains unclear as to what would be required if there were to be another food 
safety incident of a similar nature.   
  It is quite obvious that the law has lagged behind in the development of China’s 
economy and food industry. The promulgation of a special law covering all aspects of 
food safety might be a better avenue than the current piecemeal approach for 
strengthening food safety. 
4.2  Overlapping, contradictory and internationally inconsistent food safety 
standards 
In the post-Maoist era of economic reform and gradual opening of the Chinese 
economy, standards related to food safety have increased at a rapid rate as can be 
seen in Figure 3. A food quality and safety standard system is taking shape in China. It 
includes 1,800 national food safety standards developed by the government, and over 
2,900 private standards adapted or developed by private industry. Six hundred and 
thirty-four national standards are compulsory（Xinhua, 2007a).The harmonization of 
national standards to Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) standards is improving. 20 
 
For example, the convergence between Chinese standards for tolerance, in the case 
of contamination, and Codex standards reached 81 percent (i.e. the same 
contaminant and same food category). For pesticide residues, convergence of 
Chinese and Codex standards increased from 14.6 percent to 85.4 percent (same 
pesticide and same food category) (Kan Xuegui and Zhang Zhiqiang, 2005). 
 
Source: Hanjun, Report on Food Safety in China 2007, p.5 
There are, however, still some outstanding problems that need to be dealt with:   
•  The standards are not unified so there are overlapping and sometimes 
inconsistent standards for the same food products. For example, there are 
more than 40 standards relating to milk products and in the case of food 
suitable for infants there are five different standards alone for the formulation of 
milk powder-based products. This results in a degree of confusion for both food 
enterprises and enforcement agencies. 
•  Some standards are absent or poorly specified. If one compares China’s 
standards and the standards of the Codex and the ISO there is an incomplete 
classification system and a lack of quality thresholds for raw materials used in 
fruit and vegetable processing. These deficiencies create difficulties for 
















certifying the quality of agri-food products and in certifying that products are of a 
higher quality, that would justify a price premium.   
•  A number of standards are lower than international norms. For example, for 
grains the Chinese tolerance threshold for lead is 0.4mg/kg, while the Codex 
standard is only 0.2mg/kg. A number of Chinese standards for the tolerance of 
pesticide residue are one-fifth to one-half of those in the European Union and a 
few diverge to an even greater degree (Table 4). 
 














ACEPHATE 0.5  0.02 Fruit 25 
CARBARYL 2.0  0.5 Vegetables  4 
CARBENDAZIM  0.5 0.1 Fruit, 
Vegetables 
5 
CARBOFURAN 0.5  0.1 Rice  5 
CHLOROTHALONIL 1.0  0.01  Fruit, 
Vegetables
100 
FENVALERATE  0.2 0.05 Fruit, 
Vegetables 
4 
METHAMIDOPHOS 0.1  0.01 Rice  10 
DIAXINON 0.1  0.05 Crude Grain 2 
PHOSPHAMIDON 0.1 0.05 Crude Grain 2 
ALDRIN 0.02  0.01  Crude Grain 2 
DIELDRIN 0.02  0.01 Crude Grain 2 
Source: Hanjun, Report on Food Safety in China 2007, p. 227 
 
4.3 Decentralized administrative structure 
Currently, the supervision of food safety involves the departments of 
environment, agriculture, quality supervision and inspection, industry and commerce, 
and human health, with little coordination effort from the central government (Table 5). 22 
 
Further, given the hierarchical structure of the Chinese administrative system where 
delivery of many functions is carried out by provincial and local governments, there is 
little coordination of food safety activities at the county level. Primary production in 
agriculture is supervised by the State Administration of Environmental Protection (AEP) 
and the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA); the quality and daily hygiene of food processing 
is overseen by the State Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and 
Quarantine (AQSIQ); the transportation, storage and distribution of food is the 
responsibility of the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC); hotels, 
restaurants and institutions that serve food are supervised by the Ministry of Health 
(MOH). In addition, imported and exported agricultural products and other foodstuffs 
are overseen by the Quality Supervision and Inspection Department. A State Food and 
Drug Administration (SFDA) was put in place in 2003, with responsibility for integrated 
food-safety supervision and coordination as well as the investigation of and imposition 
of penalties for major food safety incidents. The SFDA, however, has no power to 
overrule government ministries. The SFDA is only a semi-ministry and has to 
coordinate with several ministries that have a higher administrative rank. When there 
is a conflict between these departments, the SFDA’s decisions or opinions can be 
ignored and may well not be implemented. Thus, it is almost impossible for the SFDA 
to fulfill its coordination mission while so much overlap and separation of jurisdictions 
remain. 
  As a result, when the entire supply chain from land to table is considered, this 
dispersed structure neither facilitates coordination nor supports effective 
implementation of food safety regulations. Problems associated with overlapping 
functions, overstaffing, a divorce between powers and responsibilities and duplication 
of law enforcement efforts are inevitable. Each department often considers only its 
own interests when there are food safety incidents or disease outbreaks. Moreover, 
superfluous laws and regulations enacted by different departments impair rather than 
enhance the administration of food safety and increase costs. Food producers do not 
receive clear signals from regulators. The frequency of food safety incidents and a 23 
 
number of scandals involving the conduct of officials in recent years have revealed 
loopholes in managerial accountability and inefficiency in the supervision system.  
 
Table 5: Governmental Agencies Involved in Food Safety in China 




- Standards for environmental quality 
- Protection of air, soil and water 





- Production of plants, animals and fish 
- Pesticide residues 
- Animal and feed hygiene 
- Veterinary medicines 






- Food standards 
- Food processing and producing practices and 
guidelines  







- Labeling registration 
- Market commodity surveillance  Transportation, Storage 
and  Distribution 
MOH 
Ministry of Health 
- Food borne illness 
- Food contamination 
- Protection of public health 
- Hygiene surveillance of restaurants and canteens
Consumption 
SFDA 
State Food and Drug 
Administration 
- Food safety coordination   
- Food safety monitoring and enforcement 
- Risk assessment of food safety hazards 
The entire supply chain   
 
Given the multifaceted structure of food safety management, in order to 
strengthen the supervision of exporting foodstuffs, China has adopted a hygiene 
registration system for all enterprises producing food for export. An enterprise has to 
be registered before engaging in the production of food for export. Thus far, 12,714 
enterprises have been registered, among which 3,698 have passed the HACCP 
certification program of the entry-exit inspection and quarantine authorities (Xinhua, 
2007a). Hence, firms exporting food products are generally safe and can comply with 
the trading partner’s standards.   
4.4 A large number of small scale food processors 
The Chinese regulatory system for food safety has difficulty dealing effectively 24 
 
with the very large number of small-scale food processing plants that characterize the 
industry. Most food producers are small traditional enterprises with inadequate capital 
to fully utilize modern processing techniques. Food processors are often family 
businesses using family labour. At present, China has approximately 448,000 
enterprises engaged in food production and processing. Of them, only 26,000 
enterprises are large enough to be considered modern industrial enterprises – those 
with annual sales in excess of US$1 million are deemed to be of a designated scale, 
69,000 are enterprises with less than US$1 million in sales but with more than ten 
employees, and 353,000 are small businesses or workshops with fewer than ten 
employees (Xinhua, 2007a). 
 
 
Sources: Xinhua (2007) White Paper on Food Quality and Safety2007-08-17. Available at: 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-08/17/content_6032557.htm. 
 
Poor machinery, obsolete technologies, poor management skills and low levels 
of technical education in small family enterprises are the source of many food safety 
problems. These small-scale enterprises also have little or no motivation to comply 




Enterprises with sales exceeding US $ 1 million 
Enterprises with less than US$1 million in sales but with more than 10
employees 
Small businesses and workshops with fewer than 10 employees
Figure 4: Chinese Food Enterprises of different 25 
 
with national regulations if they do not face penalties for non-compliance, or if they 
must incur significant compliance costs. Further, they may pursue profits in the short 
run rather than attempting to build a reputation. 
Clearly, China’s rapid economic growth and increasing integration into the 
global economy have required reforms to the food safety regime and have put 
considerable stress on its administrative structures. This does not mean that food 
safety problems in China are endemic. Given the challenges faced by developing 
countries, China’s food safety record is very good. Of course, there is always room for 
improvement. As with any large bureaucracy, change will be a slow and torturous 
process without a major shock. The rash of product safety incidents, with Chinese 
made products in 2007, may have provided that shock. Beyond dealing with the 
specific product where safety problems arose, China’s government has taken swift 
action aimed at reducing the collateral damage its products have suffered in foreign 
markets. 
5.0 China’s Food Safety Reforms   
5.1 The food safety recall program 
The Chinese government introduced a recall system for unsafe food on August 
27, 2007. The General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and 
Quarantine (AQSIQ) issued a document titled Provisions on the Administration of 
Food Recalls (China Update, 2007). Food manufactures were charged with the major 
responsibility for keeping unsafe food out of the market 
According to the Provisions, the AQSIQ, and its regional branch departments 
as the direct supervisory authorities, will have administrative responsibility for food 
recalls. In addition, to provide technical support for the investigation and assessment 
of food safety, the AQSIQ and its regional branch departments will establish an Expert 
Committee of Food Recalls (the Expert Committee). A food recall information system 
will also be put in place by the AQSIQ, while regional branch departments have the 
duty to keep food quality records for the manufacturers within their jurisdictions. 
Moreover, food manufacturers are required to set up complete product quality and 26 
 
safety records and relevant management systems and also to promptly report 
information pertaining to food hazards to the governing provincial or municipal quality 
supervisory authorities. 
Food recalls in each category are divided into three levels on the basis of the 
degree of harm and social impact. First-level recalls apply to unsafe food that has 
induced or may result in serious harm, or where the product has been widely 
distributed or has a great social influence. For the latter, read the potential to cause 
considerable collateral damage to a range of Chinese products. Second-level recalls 
are used in the case of unsafe foods that cause moderate harm, or that have a limited 
distribution or moderate negative social influence. Third-level recalls are applied to 
unsafe food that can cause a small degree of harm or whose labels do not provide 
sufficient information on the ingredients contained. 
Further, food recalls are classified into proactive or compulsory under different 
situations. For proactive recalls, once the food is confirmed as unsafe, the 
manufacturer must immediately ceased to produce or sell its product, and must recall 
it in the following specified manner: (1) after the food is confirmed as being unsafe, 
distributors must be told to stop selling the food within one day. Consumers must also 
be notified within one day for first-level recalls, two days for second-level recalls, and 
three days for third-level recalls; (2) after the food is confirmed as being unsafe, the 
manufacturer must submit a food recall plan to the supervisory authorities within three 
days for first-level recalls, five days for second-level recalls, and seven days for 
third-level recalls; and (3) after the recall is implemented, the manufacturer must 
submit progress reports on the recall to the supervisory authorities within three days 
for first-level recalls, seven days for second-level recalls, and fifteen days for 
third-level recalls. 
As for compulsory recalls, the AQSIQ will directly intervene to force a food 
manufacturer to recall its unsafe food and issue a consumer alert, or adopt other 
measures to prevent hazards if the manufacturer deliberately conceals food hazards, 
or fails to take actions when it should have proactively recalled it. 27 
 
For the purpose of providing incentives for food manufacturers to comply with 
the regulations, the Provisions contain penalties for both food manufacturers and food 
administrators. For example, a food manufacturer that breaches the Provisions and 
fails to stop selling unsafe food will first be given a warning and a deadline by which it 
must comply. If the food manufacturers do not comply, they will be fined RMB30,000. 
On the other hand, if a government employee, an expert or a staff member engaged or 
employed in a food safety investigation pertaining to a food recall invents or spreads 
false or exaggerated rumours, violates secrecy provisions or falsifies conclusions, they 
will be subject to administrative disciplinary action. If they are the cause of losses, they 
will bear legally liable. If a crime is committed, the offender will be subject to criminal 
prosecution. 
5.2 The food safety inspection program   
  This program includes two parts. The first was a four-month long nationwide 
intensive inspection and evaluation of the food safety system starting in September, 
2007. The goal was to eradicate hidden potential causes of food accidents in rural 
regions and regions of urban-rural interface. It represented the largest effort to improve 
food safety in over a decade and covers farm level produce, processed food, the hotel, 
restaurant and institutional sector, drug use, imported and exported goods and 
products closely linked to human safety and health. For farm produce, the use of 
pesticides, veterinary medicines, feed additives and fertilizers that have been banned 
or limits specified for their application are priority areas for improvement. Eradicating 
the use of banned pesticides, agricultural chemicals and feed additives and 
strengthening the inspection of imports and exports of food products are also priority 
areas. In the processed food and the restaurant sector, the focus was on small-sized 
food companies, workshops, restaurants and small retailers in rural areas. In these 
enterprises, locally processed foods are commonly incorrectly labelled or contain 
inferior ingredients. All food processors, restaurants and retailers were to be inspected 
to ensure that they have business and hygiene licenses. Vegetables, fruits, meat, 
edible oils, aquatic products, children’s food and health food are the main target 28 
 
products (China Daily, 2007).   
  By the end of 2007, all unlicensed restaurants were to be closed and all food 
producers must be deemed qualified by AQSIQ. In addition, they are expected to 
report food safety accidents in a timely manner. Government, at the township and 
county levels must establish food accident response systems and the monitoring and 
test results are to be made public (GOV, 2007). 
  The second part of the program is targeted at increasing inspection capacity. 
The central government is investing 8.8 billion yuan (US$ 1.2 billion) to improve food 
and drug monitoring. This investment will improve inspection technology for the 
agencies responsible for food and drug administration over three to five years (Xinhua, 
2007b). 
  The investment will be used for the renovation of sixteen testing centres dealing 
with imported drugs, a renovation of the National Centre for Medical Devices Testing 
and to improve the facilities of the local food and drug supervision bureaus in the 
western and central parts of China (Xinhua, 2007b). 
5.3 The food safety labelling program 
On August 27, 2007, the Chinese government launched a new set of food 
labelling rules. The General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and 
Quarantine (GAQSIQ) enacted the Administrative Provisions on Food Labelling. In the 
process it repealed the Provisions on Punishing Food Labelling Violations that the 
former State Bureau of Technical Supervision promulgated in 1995(China Update, 
2007). 
The new Provisions will apply to the labelling of food and require that the 
following information appear on food labels: (1) name of the food, (2) place of 
production, (3) name and address of the manufacturer, (4) production and expiration 
dates, “best by” and/or “consume by” dates, (5) an ingredient list, (6) the serial 
numbers of the national, trade, or local standards that the product adheres to, and (7) 
the quantity of the product. 
The Provisions outline the legal liabilities facing violators of the above 29 
 
guidelines. For example, if an entity fails to correctly label a food product or its 
packaging, it will be ordered to correct the violation within a certain period of time, and 
pay a maximum fine of RMB 10,000. 
In addition, starting on September 1, 2007, the AQSIQ now requires all 
packaged food for export to have a quality guarantee label. Food packaged for export 
will not be allowed to leave the country if the product does not have an inspection and 
quarantine symbol so as to effectively curb illegal exports of food, protect the interests 
of legal export enterprises, rebuild consumers’ confidence in the quality and safety of 
food made in China (i.e. eliminate the collateral damage), and help trace and recall 
products. The new measures, as part of a broader plan to improve quality standards, 
targets seafood, eggs, rice, vegetables, oil, wine and biscuits (China Embassy, 2007). 
It is clear that the Chinese government has been shaken by the extent of the 
collateral damage arising from the product safety incidents associated with a few 
products in the early part of 2007. It is doing what is expected from the model 
developed in Section 2. It is making both budgetary expenditures and imposing 
additional costs on Chinese firms. Given that the collateral damage extends to a 
number of markets in developed countries, the measures reported here are unilateral 
in nature. To examine if there are cooperative measures, Canada’s response is 
outlined in the next section. 
6.0 Canada’s Response to Food Imported from China 
Due to the widespread media reports pertaining to the safety of Chinese 
products, the confidence of Canadians in Made-in-China goods has been shaken, 
according to an Angus-Reid poll released in the fall of 2007. The survey showed that 
51 percent of respondents were paying closer attention to product labels indicating 
Made-in-China when shopping due to recent recalls of Chinese-made products. The 
survey also reported that 83 percent said Chinese products sold in Canada should 
carry a label of origin stamp and 62 percent said Canada should consider a ban on 
Chinese goods until China establishes more stringent safety controls (CBC, 2007b).   30 
 
Another survey undertaken by Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) in 
November 2007 attempted to gain insights into Canadian perceptions of Canadian, US 
and Chinese food products The survey indicates that, compared to the food products 
originating in Canada and US, Canadian consumers have a generally lower image of 
food products imported from China. Chinese products were perceived as less 
interesting, less nutritious, less environmentally friendly and less safe than both 
Canadian and US products (Figure 5). Further, on criteria such as ‘have a good 
reputation’, ‘am willing to buy’, ‘known for wholesome foods’, etc, Chinese products 
were consistently ranked lower than those for the US and Canada (Figure 6). These 
results suggest that Chinese products are suffering from collateral damage in the 
Canadian market. 
In addition to the widely reported incidents of product safety problems with 
imports from China, some Canadian consumers became ill from eating seafood 
originating from China. While the seafood problem was effectively dealt with, the 
Canadian government has been increasingly aware of a decline in the trust of 
Canadian consumers regarding food products from China. Individuals, some 
consumer advocacy groups and the media have suggested, and sometimes 
demanded, that the Canadian government take action to ensure the well-being of 
Canadians. The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) – which is responsible for 
protecting Canadians from unsafe food products – and more broadly the Canadian 
government has maintained that its oversight of imports of food from China is more 
than adequate and that it has no plans to change its operations. In particular, the CFIA 
has been holding fast to the principle of targeting problems rather than targeting 
countries to solve any real problems with the safety of imported foods. As suggested in 
the model developed in Section 2, this is consistent with Canada’s WTO obligations 
not to discriminate in its application of SPS regulations. Further, the Canadian 
government has refused to heed the calls coming from some quarters for an import 




Figure 5: Canadian Consumer Perceptions of Canadian, US and Chinese Food Products 
Perceptions of Canadian, US & Chinese Food Products
When you buy food products grown or processed in Canada,US or China, how likely do you think it is


































Source: Linda Robbins, Marketing and Branding in the Canadian Agri-Food Market, Market and Industry Services Branch, AAFC. 
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Figure 6: Perceptions of Canadian, US & Chinese Food Systems
Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements











Good reputation for Food
Willing to Pay
Known for Wholeseome Foods
Farmers concerned about food safety
Farmers concerned about food quality
Farmers concerned about the enviroment
Farmers concerned about animal welfare
Get good foods
Processors fulfuil wants
Know how to produce safe foods
Processors make interesting foods
Farmers trustworthy and honest
Processors trustworthy and honest
Always high quality food





Source: Linda Robbins, Marketing and Branding in the Canadian Agri-Food Market, Market and Industry 
Services Branch, AAFC. 33 
 
Consumer’s trust and confidence are an essential element of a well-functioning 
market – one that, for example, does not suffer from the market failure arising from 
collateral damage. Given the welfare loss suffered by Canadians due to collateral 
damage, the government has an important role to play in rebuilding trust. According to 
the 2007 Speech from the Throne, the Canadian government committed to 
"introducing measures on food and product safety to ensure that families have 
confidence in the quality and safety of what they buy." Moreover, on December 17, 
2007, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced Canada’s Food and Consumer 
Safety Action Plan. This Action Plan proposes to enhance Canada's health and safety 
protection system by supporting collaboration, strengthening safety programs and 
replacing outdated statutes with new regimes. Fundamental to the Action Plan is a 
focus on active prevention, targeted oversight and rapid response (HC, 2008). This 
initiative is aimed at taking proactive measures to enhance the effectiveness of the 
systems used to ensure product safety. It does not target countries but rather is 
targeted at problems. Hence, it is consistent with the non-discrimination obligations 
assumed by Canada under the WTO. 
While maintaining the existing import regime helps to calm any reservations 
consumers have regarding the government’s diligence in protecting their well-being, it 
does nothing to correct the market failure associated with collateral damage. As shown 
in Section 2, collateral damage suffered by foreign food products reduces the welfare 
of Canadian consumers. A cooperative approach was one potential option for dealing 
with the problem of collateral damage. The Canadian government appears to be 
pursuing a cooperative strategy through two important initiatives. 
Health Canada has launched a new Canada-China Joint Committee, which 
consists of representatives from a number of Canadian and Chinese government 
departments. It also invites academics, researchers, and representatives from 
non-governmental organizations involved in health matters to attend meetings, to 
share information, to assist in establishing goals and be involved in addressing 
emerging issues. Subjects to be discussed by the Joint Committee include: (1) food, 34 
 
drug and product regulations; (2) emerging infectious diseases and; (3) the promotion 
of scientific exchange (CBC, 2007c). 
Health Canada also signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the 
Chinese General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine 
(AQSIQ) to enhance cooperation on issues related to consumer product safety and 
establish a mechanism to allow urgent contact between the two countries whenever a 
product safety issues arises. The MOU contains three major provisions: (1) the 
establishment of technical working groups that will share information on regulatory 
requirements and laboratory testing procedures for specific consumer products of 
common concern, such as toys and children’s jewellery; (2) the organization of training 
workshops for Chinese manufacturers in order to ensure their full understanding and 
compliance with Canadian safety requirements; and (3) the putting in place of common 
approaches to information-sharing and ongoing mechanisms to facilitate information 
flows between the two governments, including an urgent consultation mechanism 
which would be used when critical product safety issues arise (CBC, 2007c). 
Above all, the cooperation approach is focused on strengthening information 
sharing and enhancing transparency. While thus far the cooperative approach appears 
to be a fruitful one, some challenges remain.   
First, for Canada the biggest challenge in dealing with China is the inherent 
culture of secrecy that pervades the Chinese government – transparency is an almost 
unknown concept. Further, it is often unclear which Chinese agency CFIA should be 
dealing with on a specific issue. If they do not know who to contact, it is more difficult to 
deal with problems when they arise. Take the process for obtaining a list of facilities 
approved to export as an example. Although China has a good system for certifying 
exporters, in practice it is very difficult for a Canadian importer or the CFIA to obtain 
information on the identity of certified exporters. Canadian importers and the CFIA 
need a quick and reliable way of identifying approved Chinese exporters.   
The second major challenge concerns the frequent use of brokers or agents by 
Chinese firms wishing to export. A processing facility that is approved for export in 35 
 
China may sell to a broker. The origin of the product then becomes anonymous, 
meaning that neither Canadian importers nor the CFIA can determine which export 
plant the products came from, including whether it was a licensed exporter. It also 
means that if there is a recall or an import alert involving products from China, it is 
more difficult for the CFIA to identify the source of the problem. Traceability is absent 
in such cases. 
The third challenge is differing perspectives on food safety. For example, 
Canadians are very concerned about Botulism in food; tolerances pertaining to 
Botulism are very low. Conversely, until recently Chinese consumers usually ate, for 
example, fresh or dried mushrooms and they did not understand why a small amount 
of Botulism in canned mushrooms represented a grave danger – it is simply outside 
the realm of their experience. Hence, communicating problems that are important for 
Canadians is sometimes difficult.   
The fourth major challenge in dealing with China pertains to personnel in food 
processing establishments. Often managers or workers are used to doing things by 
rote. They agree on the rules and procedures for processing the food, and then they 
follow the rules literally and very closely. They may not, however, fully understand the 
food safety objectives behind the rules, so that when something occurs that is not 
covered by the rules they have difficulty initiating the appropriate response. This is a 
food safety management problem that requires training and new ways of thinking 
about production processes. 
7.0 Conclusions 
Food safety and international trade are increasingly intertwined (Buzby, 2003). 
China-Canada trade in agri-food products is expanding rapidly and it is in the interest 
of both countries to ensure that there is a high degree of trust in the systems in place 
to provide safe food. In 2007 a number of high profile product safety incidents with 
goods of Chinese origin took place around the globe. These incidents eroded the trust 
of Canadian consumers in the ability of both Chinese firms and the Chinese 
government to ensure the safety of exports as well as their trust in Canadian 36 
 
institutions having responsibility for food safety. China reacted quickly to the recent 
food safety incidents in order to minimize financial losses and to restore its reputation. 
The Chinese government has endeavoured to improve food quality and safety, issuing 
a series of new regulations on controlling food product quality and food safety. Among 
those regulations are administrative provisions on food recalls, food inspection and 
food labelling; implementation plans for the regulations are also laid out. The Canadian 
government has defended the integrity of its food safety institutions. It has also moved 
to cooperate with the Chinese government in its efforts to enhance its food safety 
system and rebuild its reputation. 
This paper has examined the question of the appropriate trade policy response 
in the face of collateral damage – a market failure that occurs when there is a loss of 
trust in the safety of a product when no food safety problem has been identified. 
Collateral damage will likely lead to a loss of welfare for both the importing country and 
the exporting country. Hence, it is in the interest of both countries to work to restore 
trust so that the market failure is removed. Unilateral action by either the importing or 
the exporting country is unlikely to lead to the elimination of the market failure. In 
addition, some forms of unilateral actions by an importing country may lead to trade 
actions – primarily because they would violate the principle of non-discrimination. 
Such unilateral actions may also carry the risk of retaliation in the form of non-tariff 
barriers being imposed on unrelated goods of the country taking the unilateral action. 
For all these reasons, a cooperative approach such as that taken by Canada and 
China is suggested. Further, cooperation can allow the discriminatory increase in food 
safety efforts without the threat of trade actions or non-transparent retaliation. 
Cooperation can lead to an efficient approach to removing the market failure. 
Rebuilding trust is a poorly understood activity. It may be very difficult for the Chinese 
government to unilaterally rebuild the trust of Canadians. The same result may be 
attained by the Canadian government at a much lower cost. On the other hand, 
Chinese firms may be more willing to agree to cost increasing food safety measures 37 
 
suggested by the Chinese government than if they are demanded by foreign 
governments. 
No food safety system can be completely effective. Food safety incidents will 
occur for both products of domestic origin and for imports. Key to maintaining trust in 
the safety of food is a quick and transparent response – a business as usual approach. 
The Chinese government has yet to fully understand the importance of this measured 
response to food safety incidents. It tends to favour high-level political responses to 
incidents. The media coverage associated with this approach to food safety policy is 
likely counter productive to the goal of regaining the trust of consumers in developed 
market economies, including Canada. This clash of cultures is very transparent in a 
globalized market. While the Chinese government is taking measures to update and 
strengthen its food safety system, it has yet to achieve a “business and usual” image 
for its food safety system among consumers in developed countries. This is an area 
where cooperation with the Canadian government has much to offer. 
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